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Abstract
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) vendors and corpus
providers would both benefit from tools to reliably extrapolate
performance metrics for large speaker populations without col-
lecting new speakers. We address false alarm rate extrapolation
under a worst-case model whereby an adversary identifies the
closest impostor for a given target speaker from a large popula-
tion. Our models are generative and allow sampling new speak-
ers. The models are formulated in the ASV detection score
space to facilitate analysis of arbitrary ASV systems.
Index Terms: speaker verification, false alarm rate, closest im-
postor, black-box attack, PLDA, implicit generative models
1. Introduction
How unique the human voice is? This question is clearly rel-
evant for practical deployment of automatic speaker verifica-
tion (ASV) technology — yet, scarcely addressed [1] due to the
open-ended nature of the question. Unlike passwords that have
zero uncertainty conditioned on person’s identity [2], the human
voice is subject to both extrinsic and intrinsic variations, none
of which are deterministic. ‘Uniqueness’ thus depends both on
data conditions and the observer (e.g. a specific ASV system or
listener). In our recent work [3], we addressed an alternative,
more tangible question:
Given a specific ASV system (black-box) and eval-
uation corpus, how does the false alarm rate be-
have with an increased number of speakers?
To be precise, we modeled the sampling process of nontarget
detection scores of a given ASV system through a probabilistic
generative model to enable indefinite increasing of the impostor
population size without having to collect new speech data. The
assumption is that the underlying sampling process, governed
by the properties of the ASV system (treated as a black-box)
and corpus, remains fixed. Drawing a random nontarget score
proceeds in two steps. First, we draw a random pair of speakers
implicitly represented by a Gaussian distribution which models
similarity scores between these two speakers. Second, we draw
a random score from that distribution.
In [3] we also revised the notion of ‘nontarget speaker’.
Apart from efforts devoted to the study of spoofing attacks [4],
standard evaluation benchmarks of ASV technology [5] assume
nontarget speakers to be non-proactive or zero-effort impostors
— other random speakers paired up with targets. We, instead,
considered worst-case impostors with a deterministic, proac-
tive imposture policy: given a target speaker of interest (for in-
stance, a notable politician), the adversary identifies the closest
impostor to the given target from a large population (such as the
Internet) to increase the chance of this impostor to be accepted
as the targeted speaker. This is an instance of adversarial attack
[6, 7] on ASV [8, 9]. The general motivations are to identify
loopholes of ASV and to develop defense mechanisms against
them.
In this study we improve upon the generative model pre-
sented in [3]. Despite demonstrating expected overall trends,
the predicted false alarm rates were substantially overestimated,
particularly at high ASV thresholds (proxies of high-security
applications). To tackle this shortcoming, we propose a dis-
criminative training method which uses empirical estimates of
false alarm rates as targets. The setup is similar to standard re-
gression tasks except that our primary goal is extrapolation —
making predictions substantially beyond the range of inputs in
the training set. In our context, this means predicting false alarm
rate of an ASV system for a population of, say, 100, 000 non-
target speakers but with access to data from only 1000 speakers.
Without additional assumptions on the predictor functions, stan-
dard regression methods available in machine learning libraries
have higher risk of producing meaningless results (see [10]).
In general, the task of learning interpretable functional de-
pendencies has received far less attention within machine learn-
ing compared to natural sciences, where discovering physically
plausible models is important. To obtain more trusthworthy pre-
dictions, we build upon a regressor which takes into account the
specifics of detection score distribution governed by unobserved
similarities between speakers. Specifically, it uses a generative
model of ASV scores together with an estimator of false alarm
rates in a single prediction pipeline.
Another novelty of this work is modeling the generation of
nontarget scores using probabilistic linear discriminant analy-
sis (PLDA) in detection score space. PLDA [11] — a genera-
tive model in the space of vector representations of speech utter-
ances (e.g. i-vectors or x-vectors) — is well-known by ASV re-
searchers. Our formulation, however, differs substantially from
this familiar use case as our modeling takes place in the detec-
tion score, rather than vector space. We use PLDA to gener-
ate ‘new’ detection scores. The scores used for training can,
but are not required to be outcomes of trial comparisons by an
actual PLDA model. We learn PLDA whose log-likelihood ra-
tio scores are designed to approximate distribution of detection
scores of any ASV system. Similar to [3], our models require
no other data than ASV scores (and their labels). In specific, we
do not need any speaker embeddings to train our PLDA score
generator.
2. Preliminaries
We begin with a brief review of some necessary technical back-
ground on false alarm rate, its extrapolation, and PLDA.
2.1. False alarm rate
The false alarm (FA) rate is defined as
PFA(τ) ≡
∫ ∞
τ
p(s|non) ds, (1)
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where τ ∈ R is a detection threshold and p(s|non) is the prob-
ability density of nontarget scores of an ASV system. The FA
rate can be written as the expectation Es∼p(s|θnon)[I{s > τ}],
and approximated by Monte-Carlo (MC) sampling as
PFA(τ) ≈ 1
R
R∑
r=1
I{sr > τ}, sr ∼ p(s|θnon), (2)
where r = 1, . . . , R are the indices of the nontarget trials and
I{·} is an indicator function. Each nontarget trial consists of a
pairwise comparison of utterances from two different speakers
(conversely, a target trial constitutes a pairwise comparison of
utterances from the same speaker). In the special case when
every unique speaker pair in a trial list has the same number of
trials, L, the above estimator is the same as averaging speaker-
pair specific FA rates:
1
R
R∑
r=1
I{sr > τ} = 1
T
T∑
i=1
1
L
L∑
`=1
I{si,` > τ} (3)
where si,` denotes the `th score from the ith speaker pair, T is
the number of unique speaker pairs and R = T · L.
This reformulation of (2) leads to an alternative estimator
of PFA as presented in [3]:
PFA(τ) ≈ 1
T
T∑
i=1
P
(i)
FA (τ), P
(i)
FA (τ) =
1
|Si|
∑
s`∈Si
I{s` > τ},
(4)
where Si is the set of scores for the ith speaker pair consisting
of an enrolled (target) speaker and an impostor selected ran-
domly from a dataset and P (i)FA (τ) is the corresponding speaker-
pair specific FA rate. The following discussion is based on the
fact that selecting a random impostor is equivalent to select-
ing a random subset of N speakers, followed by selecting a
random speaker from this subset. Thus, (4) can be interpreted
as averaging of results of T stochastic simulations, where both
the target speaker and the impostor subset are randomly drawn
from a given database. This is in line with typical ASV trial de-
signs, where (zero-effort) impostors can be considered as ran-
dom speakers with different identity.
This view of (4) allows us to consider several alternative
policies to choose an impostor. We consider worst-case impos-
tor that is the closest match to a given target speaker. The ad-
versary might locate the closest impostor using a speaker iden-
tification system [12] or by other means. In [3] we proposed
a new metric, worst-case FA rate with N impostors, abbrevi-
ated PNFA(τ). It represents a scenario where target speakers are
scored against their closest impostors. We also introduced gen-
erative model of nontarget scores to allowN to exceed the num-
ber of speakers in the corpus. This allows extrapolation of FA
rates for arbitrarily-sized impostor population.
2.2. Probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA)
PLDA [11] models between- and within-class distributions of
high-dimensional vectors using low-dimensional subspaces. In
ASV, PLDA is used to model distributions of speaker embed-
dings and for same/different speaker hypothesis testing. PLDA
was revised in [13] and [14] (see also [15]). We use the so-called
two-covariance PLDA [14]. It models the jth embedding of the
ith speaker by
φi,j = b+ yi + εi,j , (5)
where b ∈ RD is the center of the embedding space, yi ∈ RD
is a latent speaker identity variable with normal priorN (0,B),
and εi,j ∈ RD is residual with prior N (0,W). B and W
are the between- and within-class covariance matrices. The pa-
rameters θplda = {b,B,W} are typically estimated via the
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm [16, 17] using a set
of development speakers (different from target speakers).
At the recognition stage, θplda is used for computing log-
likelihood ratio (LLR) score for a given pair of enrollment and
test utterances, as
s(φe,φt) = log
p(φe,φt|H0,θplda)
p(φe,φt|H1,θplda) , (6)
where H0 and H1 denote, respectively, the target (same
speaker) and nontarget (different speaker) hypotheses. H0 as-
sumes that φe and φt share the same latent identity variable and
H1 assumes that their latent identity variables are different. The
score (6) is given by a closed-form expression — see [18].
2.3. PLDA in the score space
In this work, we do not use PLDA to model speaker embed-
dings. For generality, all our modeling takes place in the detec-
tion scores space. We use PLDA to model the distribution of
empirical scores of any ASV system — whether or not based
on a PLDA back-end. Note, first, that (6) represents a determin-
istic function s : R2D → R that assigns a real number to any
pair of embeddings. Concerning performance assessment, the
embeddings are not relevant. The distribution of the detection
scores (rather, the order of the scores) is a complete descrip-
tion of the detection error trade-off (DET) behavior of a given
system [19]. Second, note that PLDA is a generative model —
it allows sampling new ‘speakers’ in the y-space. We want to
fit a PLDA model whose score generation mechanism produces
distributions similar to the given empirical scores.
To this end, we first note that PLDA is heavily over-
parameterized from the perspective of LLR score order preser-
vation. A centered PLDA model (b = 0) uses D(D + 1)/2
parameters for each of the matricesB andW, totaling D2+D
[15]. In fact, we need only D numbers. Note that any invert-
ible linear transformation of the feature space leaves the order of
scores unchanged. Hence, it does not alter a DET-curve. We can
therefore perform simultaneous diagonalization [20, 21] of the
within-class and between-class covariance matrices such that
(i)B becomes an identity matrix and (ii)W becomes diagonal:
W = diag (d1, . . . , dD). Therefore, a PLDA model can be
defined through D nonnegative numbers. We use this minimal
parametrization in our experiments.
3. Extrapolating false alarm rates
With the above preliminaries, we are now set to present mod-
els to produce predictions of PNFA(τ). We consider two differ-
ent types of models. Our previous model [3] is a special case
of a location-scale model described below, while PLDA-based
model is a new proposal. Both models serve to approximate the
distribution of sets of scores between a random target speaker
and the closest impostor selected from a random set of N im-
postors. These sets of scores can be viewed as outcomes of the
generative process in Algorithm 1.
Here, sim(·, ·) is any speaker similarity measure. Since ex-
plicit speaker representation are not available in the general case
the similarity function has to be computed from a set of speaker-
pair specific scores. This case includes estimating PNFA(τ) from
empirical scores. We use the mean value of scores as a similar-
ity measure. Given a sampled set of score sets {S1, . . . ,ST },
we compute the corresponding MC estimates of the speaker-
pair conditioned FA rates {P(1)FA (τ), . . . ,P(T )FA (τ)}— the indi-
vidual terms of the sum in (4). Averaging them yields an esti-
mate of PNFA(τ). We now describe two generative models that
Algorithm 1
for i = 1, . . . , T do
Sample random enrolled (target) speaker, y(i)e .
Sample N random test speakers, y(i)t,1 ,y
(i)
t,2 , . . . ,y
(i)
t,N .
Find the closest speaker y(i)t,k , where
k = argmaxj sim(y
(i)
e ,y
(i)
t,j )
Sample scores Si = {s`}Li`=1 between y(i)e and y(i)t,k .
end
allow sampling scores according to Algorithm 1 for an arbitrary
N . Each model can be trained on sets of speaker-pair specific
ASV scores and further be used for FA rate extrapolation.
3.1. Location-scale models
Our first family of models assumes the distribution of between-
speaker scores for a given pair of speakers to be a scaled and
shifted version of some base distribution defined by its cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF). Our earlier model [3] assumes
a Gaussian base distribution. The following generalized algo-
rithm allows to generate a set of between-speaker scores for
given N :
1. Sample N pairs of location-scale values {(µj , σj)}Nj=1
2. Find the largest location parameter µk = maxj{µj}
3. Sample scores Si = {s`}Li`=1 by s` = µk+σkF−1(u`),
where u` ∼ U [0, 1] is uniformly-distributed.
Here, F (·) is the CDF of the base distribution of scores. The al-
gorithm uses inverse transform sampling [22] to generate scores
from the underlying distribution. Each pair (µj , σj) parameter-
izes the distribution of scores between a fixed target speaker
and the jth impostor. It also assumes that the closest impos-
tor has the largest location parameter µj . One limitation of the
model in [3] is the unrealistic assumption of Gaussian between-
speaker scores. Here F (·) is allowed to be arbitrary. In practice,
we use torchpwl1 to define a piece-wise linear function with
monotonicity constraint for CDF approximation.
3.2. PLDA-based model
The above location-scale family of models represent speak-
ers indirectly through their relative similarities defined through
between-speaker score distributions. The model described in
this section uses, instead, latent identity variables to represent
individual speakers explicitly. This gives an alternative predic-
tor of PNFA(τ) based on PLDA.
A PLDA model with known parameters θplda can be used to
generate LLR scores, as follows.
1. Sample a pair of enrollment and test latent identity vari-
ables (ye,yt) from the prior: ye ∼ N (0,B) and yt =
ye under H0; or draw the second sample yt ∼ N (0,B)
under H1.
2. Sample a pair of enrollment and test feature vectors
φe ∼ N (ye,W), φt ∼ N (yt,W) conditioned on the
latent identity variables from the first step.
3. Compute the LLR score as s = `(φe,φt) using (6).
Note that the two first steps are stochastic, while the LLR
score is a deterministic function of the sampled pair of fea-
ture vectors and the PLDA model. Under the H1 hypothesis,
1https://pypi.org/project/torchpwl/
this generative procedure yields scores of zero-effort impostors.
Following Algorithm 1, it can be extended to sample N > 1
impostors for a given target speaker. To select the closest im-
postor, we use the LLR score (6) as a similarity measure be-
tween speakers. Given identity variable of the closest impostor,
one can sample a set of speaker-pair specific scores by repeating
steps 2 and 3 in the algorithm above.
We include a learnable monotonic warping function applied
to the scores generated by the model to increase flexibility.
3.3. Training methods
We now describe a method for training generative models in-
troduced above. The training data is a set of sets of between-
speaker scores produced by any ASV system (black-box). Gen-
erally, there are at least three alternative approaches to construct
a regressor for predicting PNFA(τ), given N and τ . The first
one is to use any standard general-purpose regression technique
to match model predictions and empirical estimates of PNFA(τ)
computed with (4) from the empirical scores. Despite the ap-
parent simplicity and attractiveness of such approach, and due
to the lack of task-specific constraints, such models are exposed
to a greater risk of failure for large values of N [10].
The second approach is to follow a two-stage strategy:
First, train a generative model of scores and use it to gener-
ate nontarget scores following Algorithm 1. Next, use the gen-
erated sets of scores to estimate PNFA(τ) using (4). We used
this approach in [3] where a location-scale model with Gaussian
base distribution was trained to maximize model log-likelihood
[17]. Different from [3], the models proposed in this work
are instances of implicit generative models: they are specified
through a forward stochastic procedure for data generation, but
do not allow direct likelihood evaluation [23, 24]. Even if im-
plicit generative models can be trained using plethora of meth-
ods different from ML estimation (see [23] and [25]), it is non-
trivial to design a training algorithm for models whose training
set is a set of sets (see, e.g. [26]), as is the case here.
In the last approach, generative model is also included to the
prediction pipeline but trained discriminatively by comparing
the model-based estimates of PNFA(τ) against the corresponding
empirical estimates (treated as ground-truth). The regressor is
trained by minimizing the mean square error (MSE) between
the empirical and model-based false alarm rates. To address
lack of differentiability, we replace the unit step function in (4)
by the sigmoid function with scaled argument. Also, the argmax
function which appears in PLDA score generating algorithm
was replaced by its approximation computed as a weighted sum
of the speaker identity variables where weights are softmax-
normalized similarities to the target speaker. This is similar to a
so-called soft-attention mechanism introduced in [27].
In contrast to purely generative training aimed at approxi-
mating distribution of scores, discriminative training optimizes
directly the final regression target. Using a restricted class of
regression functions, in turn, allows us to keep the extrapolated
values within the range of reasonable expectations.
The resulting objective function (MSE in our experiments)
includes random sampling and can be viewed as a nested
Monte-Carlo estimate of the expected loss. Generally, such MC
estimates are biased for any finite T [28] but useful for training
via stochastic optimization, provided that T is sufficiently large
(100-1000 in our experiments). We used Adam [29] optimizer
with mini-batches of size 20 and learning rate 10−3 to train both
models.
4. Experiments
We closely follow the experimental setup of [3]. We combine
Voxceleb1 [30] and Voxceleb2 [31] corpora to have a dataset
with a large number of speakers and sufficient number of utter-
ances per speaker needed for reliable estimation of PNFA . The
resulting dataset has 7365 speakers with more than 100 utter-
ances from each speaker, on average. The data was divided into
three disjoint sets with 5345, 40 and 2000 speakers. The first
set was used to train the ASV systems. The second one is the
standard Voxceleb1 evaluation protocol [32], used as a sanity
check of our ASV systems (see [3] for details). The third set
which contains 1000 male and 1000 female speakers was used
to compute scores for training models forPNFA extrapolation. We
computed similarity scores for each unique speaker pair of the
same gender. To this end, we randomly selected 18 utterances
for each of 2000 speakers to obtain at least three hundreds of
scores (182 = 324), which we assume to be sufficient to repre-
sent speaker-pair specific score distributions.
We used two standard ASV systems based on i-vectors and
x-vectors to compute ASV scores used in our experiments. Due
to the space limitations, we present results only for the x-vector
system, which has EER of 3.61% on the standard Voxceleb1
evaluation protocol. The key conclusions, however, are similar
for the i-vector system. For more details on ASV systems and
setup, refer to [3].
We computed empirical and model-based estimates of the
worst-case false alarm rates with N impostors, PNFA , by ran-
domly selecting a target speaker T = 1000 times in Algo-
rithm 1. Fig. 1 shows the estimates obtained with different mod-
els. The three groups of curves correspond to different choices
of ASV threshold, τ . As detailed in [3], these thresholds are the
minimizers of three different detection cost functions (DCFs).
The first DCF has high cost for misses (τ1), the second DCF
has equal costs for misses and false alarms (τ2), and the last
one penalizes false alarms more (τ3). The empirical curves end
up to N = 1000 impostors (as we have exhausted all data)
while the extrapolated regression curves for N > 1000 may
be used to speculate about the range of values of PNFA for large
sizes of impostor population. For instance, the ASV system
with P 1FA = PFA ≈ 1% may have the worst case false alarm rate
around 50% for N = 105. That is, if the attacker has a speech
sample of the target speaker and access to a proxy ASV system
with comparable accuracy to the attacked one, the chance of ac-
cepting the closest impostor may reach 50% for a population of
105 available impostors.
To objectively assess the quality of models’ forecasts, we
measure mean absolute error (MAE) on the extrapolated val-
ues of PNFA for a held-out set with N ∈ [660, 999] while the
corresponding empirical values (treated as the ground-truth and
computed according to (4)) were unseen by the model during
training. In specific, the inputs in the training data were formed
as pairs (N, τ) uniformly sampled from [1, 660)× [τmin, τmax],
where the range of thresholds is determined according to the
range of empirical scores. The held-out set was created simi-
larly but with a different range of N . The results summarised
in Table 1 indicate that more flexible models produce more ac-
curate predictions. For instance, using a learnable base distri-
bution instead of Gaussian decreases MAE for location-scale
models and both models benefit from score warping. The
location-scale and PLDA models have comparable accuracy.
Importantly, both provide substantial improvement over earlier,
purely generative model [3].
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Figure 1: Worst-case false alarm estimates for male scores
given by x-vector system. Two new models and the model from
[3] are shown along with the empirical estimates. The estimates
are shown together with their 99% confidence intervals.
Table 1: Extrapolation performance for different models in
terms of MAE computed on the held-out set. + indicates that a
learnable score warping function was included to a model. We
found that PLDA with 10-dimensional feature space produces
the best results.
Model MAE, %
Location-scale (Gaussian), generative [3] 8.34
Location-scale (Gaussian) 1.34
Location-scale (Gaussian, +) 0.57
Location-scale (general CDF) 0.67
Location-scale (general CDF, +) 0.48
PLDA (D = 10) 1.18
PLDA (D = 10, +) 0.39
5. Conclusions
We advanced our recent work [12, 3] on worst-case impostors
in the context of ASV. In specific, we introduced new tools for
performance extrapolation of ASV systems. The models oper-
ate on detection score space and are therefore applicable outside
the scope of ASV too. Our results indicate substantial improve-
ment over our previous model [3].
In future work, we may relax our worst-case impostor as-
sumption, for instance so that the attacker fails to identify the
closest impostor. More generally, the usual assumption in ad-
versarial machine learning where the attacker knows everything
of the attacked system is potentially overly-pessimistic.
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